Since, in general, non-orthogonal states cannot be cloned, any eavesdropping attempt in a Quantum Communication scheme using non-orthogonal states as carriers of information introduces some errors in the transmission, leading to the possibility of detecting the spy. Usually, orthogonal states are not used in Quantum Cryptography schemes since they can be faithfully cloned without altering the transmitted data. Nevertheless, L. Goldberg and L. Vaidman [Phys. Rev. Lett. 75 (1995) 1239] proposed a protocol in which, even if the data exchange is realized using two orthogonal states, any attempt to eavesdrop is detectable by the legal users. In this scheme the orthogonal states are superpositions of two localized wave packets travelling along separate channels. Here we present an experiment realizing this scheme. [7] . All of them are based on the use of non-orthogonal states, a condition that was considered necessary for guaranteeing security, up to a paper of Goldenberg and Vaidman (GV) [8] . In that work was presented for the first time a scheme for realising a QKD protocol based on orthogonal states, whose security was based on two ingredients. First, the orthogonal states sent by Alice were superposition of two localised wave packets that were not sent simultaneously to Bob. Second, the transmission time of the photons was random.
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PACS numbers: 03.67. Hk, 03.67.Dd, 42.50.Ex, 42.50.St Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a method for transmitting a secret key between two partners (usually named Alice and Bob) by exploiting quantum properties of light. The most important characteristic of this idea is that the secrecy of the generated key is guaranteed by the very laws of nature, i.e. by the properties of quantum states [1] . In the last decade QKD has abandoned the laboratories becoming a mature technology for commercialization [2] ; communications over more thane 100 km having been achieved both in fiber [3] and open air [4] .
Various protocols for realising QKD have been suggested [1], such as BB84 [5] , B92 [6] , Ekert [7] . All of them are based on the use of non-orthogonal states, a condition that was considered necessary for guaranteeing security, up to a paper of Goldenberg and Vaidman (GV) [8] . In that work was presented for the first time a scheme for realising a QKD protocol based on orthogonal states, whose security was based on two ingredients. First, the orthogonal states sent by Alice were superposition of two localised wave packets that were not sent simultaneously to Bob. Second, the transmission time of the photons was random.
This scheme, beyond its interest for application, has also a large conceptual interest for understanding the quantum resources/properties needed for QKD. Nevertheless, up to now, no experimental realization was still done. Purpose of this letter is to present its first experimental implementation.
In the theoretical proposal of Ref. [8] , the orthogonal states sent by Alice are the superpositions of two localized wave-packets. Those are not sent simultaneously to Bob, but separated by a fixed delay. In this case there is a direct correspondence between the state prepared by Alice and the bit received by Bob, for instance,
where |a and |b are two localized wave-packets and the states |Ψ 0 and |Ψ 1 are orthogonal. The states |Ψ 0 and |Ψ 1 are emitted randomly in time, and the presence of an eventual eavesdropper can be detected by legitimate users exploiting the information on the detection times [8] . The scheme works as follows: Alice sends Bob either |Ψ 0 or |Ψ 1 . The launch on the quantum channel of the wave-packet |b is delayed for some amount of time τ with respect to the launch of wave-packet |a . τ could be chosen larger than the traveling time T of photons between Alice's and Bob's locations. As |b will travel through the quantum channel only after the wave-packet |a has already reached Bob's location, both packets are never simultaneously present in the quantum channels. Furthermore, as pointed out in Ref. [8] , the requirement of τ greater than the traveling time T is not strictly necessary. Indeed the security of the protocol is ensured even if τ is only greater than the overall uncertainty in the measurement of the transmission/detection times t s and t r [8] .
In our proof-of-principle experiment this is obtained exploiting a balanced Mach-Zehnder Interferometer (MZI) with two equal optical delays OD 1 and OD 2 . According to Fig. 1 , sources of single photon S 0 and S 1 at the two input ports of the beam splitter on Alice side provide single photons propagating in the transmission channel in the state |Ψ 0 or |Ψ 1 respectively. The emission time of the single photon in one of the two state is random, but it is registered by Alice.
As the packet |b is stored in OD 1 , wave-packet |a travels from Alice's to Bob's site along the upper channel and enters in OD 2 , where it is delayed until also |b reaches Bob's site. In this way the two packets interfere as they simultaneously arrive to the second beam-splitter, thus, the click of detector D i deterministically implies that the single photon state was in the state |Ψ i , i.e. it was sent by source S i . Two security tests are performed by Alice and Bob to highlight the possible presence of an eavesdropper. The first one is a public comparison between the sending times t s and the receiving times for each photon. If we assume that the traveling time between the two parties is T , only the events detected at time t r = t s +τ +T are considered as part of the message, while all the others highlight the presence of Eve. The second one is the comparison of corresponding portions of the legitimate users' bit strings to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER). We underline that in the ideal case discrepancies in the transmission/detection times or in the bit strings can only be induced by an eavesdropper.
Let us mention for the sake of completeness that it was argued by Peres [9] that this protocol introduced no novelty with respect to BB84. To this claim GV replied that while in other protocols like BB84 the security is guaranteed by nonorthogonality, in GV protocol it is based on causality, since they proved that a successful eavesdropping would require superluminal signaling [8] . Furthermore, while all cryptographic schemes require two steps for sending information (sending the quantum object and then some classical information), in GV protocol only the first step is needed for communication, the second step is used only for assuring security against eavesdropping. Fig.1 shows the setup of the experiment representing the first realization of the GV protocol. The single photon states are obtained exploiting an heralded single photon source based on parametric down-conversion (PDC) [11] . A CW 100 mW Coherent Cube diode laser system at 406 nm is used to pump a BBO type I crystal. PDC photons pairs at degeneracy (812 nm) are emitted in slightly non-collinear regime (three degrees with respect to the pump direction). The heralding photons are selected by means of 1 nm bandwidth interference filters, collected in a multimode optical fiber and detected by Single Photon Avalanche Photo-diodes (SPAD) detectors. The heralded single photon, the carrier of the information to be exchanged between the legitimate parties, is collected in a single mode optical fibre (a 10 nm interference filter is placed on the heralding arm only for background suppression). The CW laser operation ensures the generation of photon pairs at random time, and the detection of one photon of the pair in the heralding arm provides the temporal information on the emission of the single-photon as requested by the GV protocol. With the aim of realizing the proof-of-principle QKD scheme proposed by GV, Alice sends bit 0 or 1 by addressing the encoding photon to the proper input port of the first beam-splitter. Bob detect the single photons at the output of the interferometer. The balanced MZI contains both the optical delays and the transmission channel from Alice to Bob. In particular, after the input BS at the Alice side one arm of the interferometer contains a delay line (realized through a trombone prism), while on the other arm the delay line (again based on a trombone prism) is located on Bob's side. The positions of the trombones in the optical delays are adjusted via a closed loop piezo-movement system with nano-metric resolution. Detection events after the output BS of the interferometer are obtained by SPAD detectors operating in Geiger mode. The electronics highlighting the presence of coincident detections is based, as usual, on Time-to-Amplitude-Converter and MultiChannel-Analyser. Specifically, in our case the temporal condition for the security of the QKD scheme is satisfied as the jitter of our detectors (corresponding to the uncertainty in the determination of the of the transmission/detection times) is about 300 ps, while the length of the delay lines is 60 cm corresponding to a storage time of ∼2 ns. The stability of the interferometer has been tested by scanning the position of Alice's trombone prism with Bob's one kept at a fixed position. Fig. 2 shows the interference fringes of heralded counts and the visibilities (V) are well above 80%, irrespective of which port of the input beam splitter is used to inject the single photon in the interferometer.
The quality of the transmission is quantified by the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER = P W rong P Right +P W rong , where P Right (P W rong ) is the probability for Bob to receive a bit value which is equal to (different from) the one sent by Alice), measured to be 7%, according to Table I. In conclusion, we have realized the first proof-ofprinciple experimental implementation of QKD based on orthogonal states (GV protocol) [8] . Our results demonstrate the possibility of achieving a secure QKD transmission with orthogonal state and therefore provides a significant hint to the discussion on the minimal quantum resources necessary for the implementation of quantum tasks overcoming classical limits.
This work has been supported by PRIN 2007FYETBY (CCQOTS) and NATO (CBP.NR.NRCL 983251). We and D1 as a function of the path length difference ∆l between the two arms of the interferometer for source S0 (top picture) and S1 (bottom). As expected, the phase shifts between D0 and D1 sine fits of the coincidence counts are consistent with π.
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VD1 QBER S0 (89 ± 1)% (82 ± 1)% (7.0 ± 1.6)% S1 (88 ± 1)% (85 ± 1)% (7.1 ± 1.4)% [8] . VD0, VD1 are the visibilities of the interference fringes observed at the two outputs of the interferometer by scanning the path length difference, QBER is the estimated quantum bit error rate for the transmission.
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FIG. 3:
Detection events at both detectors D1 and D0. Top: source S0 is active, corresponding to the transmission of a string of bit 0. Bottom: source S1 is active, corresponding to the transmission of a string of bit 1. The evaluated Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER) in the two cases are QBERS1 = 0.071 ± 0.014 and QBERS0 = 0.070 ± 0.016 on a series of 60 measurements 5 seconds long, showing a remarkable phase stability of the interferometer.
